Reading Cassirer’s philosophy of myth: early signs of Heidegger’s late philosophy? In 1928, Heidegger’s book review of the second volume of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (The Mythical Thought) was published in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung. Cassirer’s text date of 1925, hence it is possible that Heidegger had read it even before the publication of Being and Time. What makes both texts worthy of a closer examination is the fact that several central motifs and terms of Heidegger’s later philosophy are already (...) present in these two texts. Heidegger focuses particularly on Cassirer’s reflections on the representation of mana (Mana-Vorstellung) in mythical thinking. This representation involves not only the distinction between the familiar and the unfamiliar, the ‘uncanniness’ or ‘not-at-homeness’ that befalls mightily the Dasein, but also the distinction between the sacred and the profane and that of the four world regions (Weltgegenden) and its organization in form of a cross. Although not everything that Heidegger announces is interpretable as full awareness of the future impact of these traces, one would wonder if the density with which they appear would be mere accident. Thus, the article contributes to the debate on the issue of the emerging of Heidegger’s late thought and its origins which can be traced back to the stage of genesis, or rather, the final draft of Being and Time. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to examine Heidegger’s analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time in the light of Sloterdijk’s criticism of it. Sloterdijk states in Spheres I that Heidegger presented, in Being and Time, an “embryonically revolutionary” approach to being and space but did not complete it. His own ‘Spheres Project’ would purport fill this gap. Based on the analysis of the fundamental moments of existential spatiality (§§12 to 28 and §70 of Being and Time), and taking into (...) account comments made by Heidegger himself in later years, I will attempt to answer the question of the alleged unfinished character of the analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time. (shrink)

We have developed a first generation tool for the unbiased identification and characterization of human pluripotent stem cells, termed PluriTest. This assay utilizes all the information contained on a microarray and abandons the conventional stem cell marker concept. Stem cells are defined by the ability to replenish themselves and to differentiate into more mature cell types. As differentiation potential is a property that cannot be directly proven in the stem cell state, biologists have to rely on correlative measurements in stem (...) cells associated with differentiation potential. Unfortunately, most, if not all, of those markers are only valid within narrow limits of specific experimental systems. Microarray technologies and recently next‐generation sequencing have revolutionized how cellular phenotypes can be characterized on a systems‐wide level. Here we discuss the challenges PluriTest and similar global assays need to address to fulfill their enormous potential for industrial, diagnostic and therapeutic applications. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo assess the impact of the closure of group-based cardiac rehabilitation training during the first COVID-19 lockdown in spring 2020 on patients’ physical activity, cardiorespiratory fitness, and cardiovascular risk, and to describe the patient experience of lockdown and home-based exercise training during lockdown.DesignMixed methods study. Prospectively collected post-lockdown measurements were compared to pre-lockdown medical record data. Quantitative measurements were supplemented with qualitative interviews about the patient experience during lockdown.SettingOutpatient CR centre in Salzburg, Austria.ParticipantsTwenty-seven patients [six female, mean age 69 years] (...) who attended weekly CR training sessions until the first COVID-19 lockdown in March 2020.Outcome MeasureQuantitative: exercise capacity, cardiovascular risk. Qualitative: individual semi-structured interviews.ResultsExercise capacity had significantly reduced from pre- to post-lockdown: mean power in maximal ergometry 165 vs. 151, p < 0.001; submaximal ergometer training 99 vs. 97, p = 0.038. There was no significant difference in Framingham risk score and other cardiovascular risk factors. Qualitative data showed that almost all patients had kept physically active during lockdown, but 17 said they had been unable to maintain their exercise levels, and 15 felt their cardiorespiratory fitness had deteriorated. Many patients missed the weekly CR training and the motivation and sense of community from training together with others. Several patients stated that without professional supervision they had felt less confident to carry out home-based exercise training at high intensity.ConclusionThis study highlights the importance of group-based supervised exercise training for patients who engage well in such a setting, and the detrimental impact of disruption to this type of CR service on physical activity levels and exercise capacity. Additionally, learning from the COVID-19 pandemic may inform the development and implementation of remote CR modalities going forward. (shrink)

Die jungsten Finanzkrisen haben die Diskussion uber die Moral der Markte wiederbelebt: Welche Verantwortung haben Unternehmen, Banken, Politik und letztlich jeder Einzelne in unserer Gesellschaft? Droht die Okonomisierung aller Lebensbereiche, der Ausverkauf des Menschen? Ist der Markt moralfrei? Brauchen wir neue Perspektiven und Werte? Diese drangenden Fragen werden im vorliegenden Buch von namhaften Autorinnen und Autoren wie Franz Muntefering und Rita Sussmuth beantwortet: Der Mensch muss wieder ins Zentrum rucken, Verantwortung und Moral sollten grundlegender Massstab auch des wirtschaftlichen Handelns sein. (...) Mit diesen Forderungen appellieren die BeitragerInnen an einen echten Dialog zwischen Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Ethik. Mit Beitragen von Bernhard Emunds, Jurgen Hardt, Linus Hauser, Esther Junger, Josef Kaiser, Siegfried Karl, Andreas Lenz, Uta Meier-Grawe, Franz Muntefering, Thomas Petersen, Marcus K. Reif, Rainer Schwarz, Rita Sussmuth und Joachim Wiemeyer". (shrink)

We extend Moss and Parikh’s modal logic for subset spaces by adding, among other things, state-valued and set-valued functions. This is done with the aid of some basic concepts from hybrid logic. We prove the soundness and completeness of the derived logics with regard to the class of all correspondingly enriched subset spaces, and show that these logics are decidable.

(Sudhoffs Archiv; Beiheft 61) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 2013. 493 S., zahlr. Abb. u. Tab., kart., € 74,00. ISBN 978‐3‐515‐10468‐5.

Doors are mediums of architecture as an elementary cultural technique, as they process the key differences of architecture from within and without. The door is a machine, through which the symbolic was materialized in architecture. This contribution describes, by means of examples from cultural, literary and art history, the monologic, epistemic and social aspects and paradoxes of the door as an analog and binary medium. With the obsolescence of the door knob, engendered by the invention of the automated revolving door, (...) the analog door has bid farewell to society and is now mutating to a bio-political instrument which no longer addresses mankind as 'persona', but as a major perturberence. (shrink)

Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the self is (...) not formed through the mere acquisition or change of roles, but rather through a process that is susceptible to crises, a process shaped by affective bonds and separations. Learning, which is the theme of pedagogy, loses its hold whenever it is confronted by disinterest and listlessness. In neurobiology, the increased significance of those zones of the brain that are connected with the realization of feelings makes the brain, accordingly, no mere apparatus that processes data, but a living organ that selects and “evaluates” what is “important.” Finally, cross-cultural comparison shows the extent to which the one-sided preference for understanding and willing, which is the mark of Western rationalism, arises from a typical, not to mention a highly masculine attitude toward the world and life, as many different studies on gender difference stress (In reference to this perspective, see Seethaler, Gefühle und Urteilskraft. Ein Plädoyer für die emotionale Vernunft, 1997). The following reflections provide a historical orientation directed toward a new determination of feelings. This new determination of feelings is phenomenological and takes the pathetic character of experience, nourished by the corporeality of experience as its point of departure. (shrink)

The essay reexamines the famous scene from Proust’s ›In Search of Lost Time‹ about the death of the writer Bergotte. In pointing out that the notorious ›patch of yellow wall‹ Bergotte claims to have discovered in Vermeer’s ›View of Delft‹ does not exist in the real painting, the article’s aim is to show that the scene is not to be read as an autobiographical recollection, but rather as a reflection on ›mimesis‹, i.e. on the transcendental conditions of perception and representation. (...) As such, it can be considered to have in large measure inspired the reorientation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenological oeuvre towards a new ontology. On the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s recently published lecture notes, the essay locates the common concern of the writer and the philosopher in the idea of remembrance not as a derivative phenomenon, but as an originary mode of givenness. (shrink)

In L’institution, la passivité. Notes de cours au Collège de France (1954-1955), Maurice Merleau-Ponty develops approaches to a concept of the unconscious that can also be relevant to a mental philosophy from the perspective of cognitive science and AI in the tradition of continental philosophy. I consider this all the more important as previous attempts at an analytical philosophy of AI tend to remain stuck in Cartesian or Platonic dualism, which – as a dream of Silicon Valley – could encourage (...) gnostic thinking (Irrgang 2021). (shrink)

Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftssystematik im 19. Jahrhundert Josef M. Werle. Drittes Kapitel Argumente zugunsten der Zukunft der Philosophie II: Wissenschaftsgeschichtliche und wissenschaftssystematische ...

At first trust plays a fundamental role within the social sphere. Accordingly, trust serves as philosophical term above all in Political, Social, and Moral Philosophy. But it is also central in recent Sociology and Psychology. Referring to these disciplines, the relationship of trust be- tween viewer and hero on the screen can be called ›parasocial‹, as-if-interaction. In contrast, ontological trust is of particular interest for recent philosophy of film. Instead of explaining it, following Deleuze, in terms of a metaphysics of (...) cinema it seems to be more adequate to com- bine the different subject-specific answers in Kant’s concept of play. Aesthetic experiences then are encouraging us in the attitude to act as if there could be trust in the world. (shrink)

Contemporary epistemology seems almost exclusively focused on questions concerning knowledge and justification. Such a focus has had two broad consequences. First, epistemologists have neglected other equally important concepts. Specifically, the concept of understanding is absent in most discussions. Secondly, discussions have avoided the role of the will in the agents to whom we attribute knowledge and justification. Surprisingly, virtue epistemology also suffers from this narrow view. Specifically, virtue epistemologists of all kinds have neglected these two important aspects of our epistemic (...) lives. I examine the spectrum of virtue theories in epistemology, and locate a gap between the two sides—responsibilism and reliabilism. This gap, I suggest, might be bridged if we take seriously (i) the idea that there are other epistemic goals apart from knowledge and justification (e.g., understanding), and (ii) that cognition requires the whole person—intellect and will—and not simply the intellect in isolation from other faculties. (shrink)

An ethical epoché is required to leave the terrain of a self-evident morality and question its origin. In particular, four fundamental motifs of the ethical dimension are identified: pathos, to be thematised as an alternative to the persistent activist unilateralism; response, which always involves body and soul; diastasis with its stumbles and subtractions; and finally coaffection, in which the social dimension of experience is announced. Ethical behaviour feeds on the magma of pathos, which in turn would be blind and directionless (...) without any ethos. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the idea of collective epistemic commonality suggested by Charles Taylor's example, and contrasts it with a distributive notion of epistemic commonality. It describes a number of accounts of collective epistemic commonality, and then argues that, contrary to what Taylor suggests, conversation is not constitutive of collective epistemic commonality as such, but rather presupposes basic forms of collective epistemic commonality. Taylor's remarks indicate that understanding the consensus is insufficient as whatever proposition people rationally and openly accept in conversation. (...) It is suggested that joint attitudes are irreducible, relational, and pre-reflective, and that such attitudes are joint, in the respect that the participants are aware of themselves as a ‘we’. Highly inferential beliefs need some form of communication, and are probably really some form of joint commitment. (shrink)

The discussion of whether people understand themselves and others by using theories of behaviour (theory theory) or by simulating mental states (simulation theory) lacks conclusive empirical evidence. Nichols et al. (1996) have proposed the Langer effect (Langer, 1975) as a critical test. From people's inability accurately to predict the difference in the subjective value of lottery tickets in choice and no‐choice conditions, they argued that people do not simulate behaviour in such situations. In a series of four experiments, we consistently (...) failed to replicate the original difference between choice and no‐choice under the conditions used by Nichols et al. We conclude that the replicability of the effect depends on an unknown combination of factors. As long as the target effect is not better understood and under better experimental control, it is difficult to use it as a yardstick against which the accuracy of simulation can be assessed. (shrink)